Keywords: game theory, fire supervision, inspection games, nash equilibrium, risk management, inspection intensity
UDC 614.84+519.83
DOI: 10.26102/2310-6018/2026.62.11.012
The article is devoted to the application of a game-theoretic apparatus for analyzing and optimizing the activities of control and supervisory authorities using the example of the State Fire Supervision of the Ministry of Emergency Situations of Russia. The structural isomorphism of "inspector – violator" systems in various fields is substantiated, which makes it possible to use a single class of mathematical models – inspection games. A basic static model in mixed strategies is presented, modified to take into account the specifics of fire safety: probabilistic damage, social losses (including the cost of human lives) and personal responsibility of the inspector for a fire at an uninspected facility are introduced. The analytical conditions of the Nash equilibrium for the violator and the inspector are derived with the transition to the time measurement of all payment characteristics. A systematic review of extensions of the basic model is carried out – hierarchical Stackelberg games, Bayesian games with information asymmetry about agent types, evolutionary dynamic models and multilevel control. Special attention is paid to the concept of minimum inspection intensity as a key performance parameter. Concepts for calculating this threshold have been proposed (deterrence of violators, prevention of corruption, protection from the worst type, evolutionary stability) and an integral criterion has been developed for assigning an individual frequency of inspections to each protection facility. A numerical example for three types of facilities (shopping center, school, warehouse) shows the differentiation of intensity – a school with high social damage requires inspections in 48.6 % of cases, and a warehouse – only 9.3 %. An algorithm is proposed that takes into account the budgetary limitation of inspectors' working hours. The method makes it possible to move from a unified regulatory frequency to a scientifically based risk-based planning of supervisory activities.
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Keywords: game theory, fire supervision, inspection games, nash equilibrium, risk management, inspection intensity
For citation: Kozhevin D.F., Egoshin A.M., Kozlov A.L. Theoretical and game models of the activities of control and supervisory bodies in the field of fire safety. Modeling, Optimization and Information Technology. 2026;14(11). URL: https://moitvivt.ru/ru/journal/article?id=2580 DOI: 10.26102/2310-6018/2026.62.11.012 (In Russ).
© Kozhevin D.F., Egoshin A.M., Kozlov A.L. Статья опубликована на условиях лицензии Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NS 4.0)Received 01.09.2026
Revised 02.11.2026
Accepted 19.11.2026