Resolving conflicts of interest between construction project participants by optimizing resource allocation

The problem of resolving conflicts of interest between participants in construction projects by optimizing resource allocation is Considered. In contrast to the traditional optimization approach, which often does not provide a solution in conflict conditions, it is proposed to use a complex Nash-Pareto criterion. In this case, the conflict of interest is resolved, since it becomes unprofitable for project participants to overestimate their resource requirements, and their resource needs are met to the maximum extent possible. A mathematical formulation of this problem is given, and based on V.N. Burkov, D.A. Novikov and Y.B. Germeier, is her decision. We consider two types of models for Nashbalanced resource allocation between project participants: direct and reverse priority. In the first case, the resource is distributed according to the principle: "more you ask – more will be given", in the second – "more you ask – less will be given". For these models, their varieties are distinguished: simple, taking into account the resource utilization coefficient, with a fine and with an incentive. For all types of models and their modifications, formulas are written to determine the resource allocation plan. The article describes an algorithm for resolving conflicts of interest between participants in construction projects by optimizing resource allocation, based on the above models and the results of their analysis. A distinctive feature of the algorithm is that the settlement of the conflict of interests of participants is supported by the search for Pareto-optimal resource allocation plans. As a discussion of the results, we consider a task where several types of resources are distributed, rather than one. It is shown that taking into account the integration of supplies and interchangeability of resources of different types, such a problem can be reduced to solving a problem for one type of resource, and the conflict of interests can be resolved using the proposed algorithm

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